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ACCOUNTANTS' INDEPENDENCE
THE RECENT DILEMMA
Tamar Frankel*
A fundamental issue has been raised recently in connection with the status of "independent accountants." The issue involves a new breed of a few very large accounting
firms. These firms are engaged in global commerce and
finance, and cater to an important segment of multinational
corporations.!
These mammoth accounting firms raise a familiar question in a new context. On the one hand, the size and diversity of the firms meet the needs of large multinational clients and offer efficiency benefits. On the other hand, these
benefits expose the firms to increased possible conflicts of
interest and endanger the firms' gatekeeping functions as
auditors. Therefore, the applicability of the independence
rules to, and the strategic structure of, these firms require
rethinking and an adjustment.
I. THE GATEKEEPERS
Independent accountants are gatekeepers. The signature of an independent accountant is required for all financial statements issued by publicly held companies and companies that plan to go public. In 1933, after the 1929 crash,
the Federal Trade Commission established the function of
accountants as independent auditors2 for the purpose of reducing the information costs to investors and strengthening
their trust in both the information that they were receiving
from issuers and in the financial system as a whole. Thus,
law grants independent accountants a monopoly by requiring issuers to resort to the accountants' services. In return,
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
The five largest accounting firms serve most major public
companies in the United States. See Auditing Rules for Accountants,
N.Y. TiMms, Feb. 2, 2000, at C14. The Big Five accounting firms include
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Andersen Worldwide, KPMG Peat
Marwick, Deloitte & Touche, and Ernst & Young.
2
See Floyd Norris, Rules That Only an Accountant Could Fail to
Understand?,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2000, at C1.
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law requires that accountants' relationships with the corporations that they audit be at arm's length.
Independent accountants must be autonomous from the
corporations that they audit. But this autonomy is not
enough. Similar to judges, who not only must be just but
also seem to be just, these accountants must seem to be independent of their client corporations. This aura of independence is crucial to the accountants' credibility in the
public's eyes. We assume that their independence will further the underlying purpose of their activity: to shore up
public confidence in the information they certify, as well as
the securities markets as a whole.
In connection with the rules ensuring accountants' independence from the issuers whom they audit, accountants
may not own the securities of, nor serve as directors and
officers for, the issuing companies that they audit. The
rules apply to partners of accounting firms, but internal
rules may extend the prohibition to managers and family
members, even so far as to include their in-laws.3 These
independence rules have been on the books for the past seventy years.
II. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF THE LARGE
ACCOUNTING FIRMS
The issue of independence arose with the recent growth
of a few accounting firms, the "Big Five." These large firms
have expanded their services, their personnel, and their
geographical reach. Ten years ago, there were no firms of
such magnitude. One reason for this growth was a legal
3
See Adrian Michaels & Michael Peel, SEC Accuses Accountancy
Firm of JeopardizingAudit Independence, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2000, at 2;
AERIcAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIc ACCOUNTANTs, CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDucT § 101-9 (Jan. 12, 1988) (as amended Jan. 14,
1992) (noting family relationships' effect on independence and defining
"close relatives" to include non-dependent children, stepchildren,
brothers, sisters, grandparents, parents, parents-in-law, and their
spouses). See also Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release
No. 42,266 (Dec. 22, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 73,389 (Dec. 30, 1999) (requiring
certain processes for corporate audit committees and defining
independence).
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expansion of the firms' functions. The initial requirements
for audits were fairly straightforward.
Auditors were
tasked with determining whether the financial statements
of their clients were prepared according to the accounting
rules, and with verifying the statements for accuracy. In
the 1970s, the functions of accountants were extended explicitly in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to include an
evaluation of the clients' internal controls.4 The Act represented congressional reaction to "porous" accounting in a
number of large multinational corporations competing for
business abroad. Competition for business in some countries involved payments to high-placed officials. To make
these payments (without acknowledging their payees),
American corporations began to create secret slush funds
backed by false documentation. This practice threatened
the legitimacy of the corporations' entire accounting system.
Congress reacted by prohibiting such payments, except
when a government agency authorized the payments under
certain conditions, and by requiring the corporations to establish internal controls to prevent "seepage" of funds. Accountants were authorized to certify that such controls existed. Accountants are well suited to the task. After all,
accounting is one form of internal control.
A second reason for the growth of these few accounting
firms was their drive for efficient service to their multinational corporation customers. Efficiency requires auditing
services to be accessible all over the world. These services
expanded to meet the customers' needs in related areas. In
short, the firms revised their business strategies and diversified their services. 5 The new strategies of these accounting firms aim at global "one-stop" services. While the large
firms offer audit services, as in the past, their objective is to
offer global "one-stop" full service, including: legal services,
tax services, management consulting, strategic planning,
information technology, and advice on mergers and acquisi4
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §
102, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (b) (2) (B)
(1994)).
5
See Seth Sutel, Stock-Owning by Accountants Tightened, REcoRD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Feb. 2, 2000, at Bi.
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tions. Another important component of the service is designing new financial products. Thus, the few large accounting firms have evolved to function in an environment,
and adopt business strategies that differ dramatically from
those of single-service auditors.'
Clearly, the synergies of this strategy are great. In the
past years the five large accounting firms' earnings have
grown by approximately twenty percent each year." The
auditing services help market other services. Arguably, it
is easier to have access to a corporation's top management
through the accounting services. Corporate management is
more comfortable with a firm that is already familiar with
its corporate practice and culture. Personal contacts have
been established, and the accounting firm is entrenched as
an outside but related part of the corporation, if not in one
service area, then in another. From a business point of
view, the auditing group serves the consulting side well by
putting the foot in the door, even if reluctantly.
The consulting side reciprocates, some consultants say,
with abundance. Auditing practice is not as lucrative as
consulting.8 Auditing may not always be very interesting
and therefore, attracts either less talented persons or novices, who leave as soon as they can.9 The promise of the
profits from the consulting side maintains the high quality
of the auditing side. From a business point of view, consulting and auditing sides match. Both sides offer diversification to the firms' partners, business synergies, and serve
clients well. The sum value of each practice separately is
The business scene for accounting services has changed as well.
Accounting firms are not only the acquirers and auditors of other firms;
they are also acquired by other businesses. For example, American
Express and H&R Block are buying up accounting firms, or at least the
non-audit part of the accounting firms. See Steve Tuckey, 37-Year Audit
Vet Is Independence Maven, INS. ACCT., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1. IBM has
considered buying or allying with PriceWaterhouseCoopers. See Beth
Piskora, IBM Mulls Buying PWC Consulting Biz, N.Y. POST, Jan. 28,
2000, at 28.
7
See PwC Rap Renews Debate over Big Five Structures, MGMT.
CONSULTANT INT'L, Jan. 20, 2000, at 1.
8
See George M. Kraw, At PriceWaterhouseCoopers,Rules Made to
Be Broken, RECORDER, Jan. 26, 2000, at 4.
9 See id.
6
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smaller than the value of their combined practices. Without the audit work the consulting practices may not be as
competitive.
The business expansion of the large accounting firms
brought additional conflicts of interest. If a firm offers
"one-stop" shopping, it is likely that the auditing and consulting services to clients would overlap. If an audit examines the services provided to a client by the consulting
practice of the same accounting firm, the firm will audit its
own advice and its own performance. If advice concerns the
well-being of a corporate client, this advice results in a conflict of interest that dampens the critical view of the auditors and pressures the auditors into relaxing their judgments, especially if the audited corporation is expected to
reciprocate by favoring the firm's consulting side with lucrative work.
III. THE INDEPENDENCE RULES AND ONE-STOP GLOBAL
SERVICE
For a number of reasons, the independence rules limit
the ability of the large accounting firms to continue the
move towards one-stop global service. First, as the number
of partners and managers grows, the cost of verifying their
independence increases. Second, partners in the consulting
side are prohibited from holding securities in any client of
the auditing side. Therefore, as the number of clients
grows, partners and others who are prohibited from investing in clients' securities are increasingly limited in their
investment choices. Arguably, auditors may not invest
even in mutual funds because most large firms audit mutual funds and advisers.
Third, the prohibition on investments can overflow to
other financial assets. Thus, when KPMG (a Big Five firm)
obtained a contract to audit Prudential, Britain's largest
life insurance company, partners and family members were
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to divest any insurance policies that they held as insureds
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of this insurance company. 0 The SEC considered applying
this rule to partners worldwide. 1 Fourth, to avoid auditing
the performance of their own firms, the consulting side of
the firms is often forced to transfer jobs to others, even
though the firms believe they can, or are even more qualified to, provide the service. An audit job for $5,000.00 may
block the opportunity to obtain a consulting job of two million dollars. One service or the other service must be choSen. Such situations not only result in losses of potential
income but also do not promote a harmonious relationship
between the audit and consulting arms of the firm.
IV. PRESSURES TO CIRCUMVENT AND VIOLATE THE
INDEPENDENCE RULES
The continued move towards one-stop service creates
pressure to circumvent and violate the independence rules.
In January 1999, the SEC censured PricewaterhouseCoopers because its auditing partners in a particular office were
investing in a client's securities while performing the
audit." PwC was ordered to retain an independent consultant at its expense to review PwC's compliance with certain
measures, and report such findings to the SEC." The review found that this incident was merely a symptom of a
much deeper problem. The law firm's report, which the
SEC adopted as its own, concluded that there were many
partners that invested in clients' securities. 4 The report
See Auditory Discomfort:Auditors Under Fire: Recent Rulings in
America Have Highlighted the Conflicts of Interest Inherent in Modern
Accountancy, EcoNoMIsT, Jan. 15, 2000 (noting that the SEC considered
worldwide partnership divestiture because Prudential was "seeking an
American stockmarket listing"); Robert Bruce, Old-Fashioned Concept
You Cannot Ignore, TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 2000, at 34.
See Auditory Discomfort,supra note 10.
See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Exchange Act Release No.
10

40,945 (Jan. 14, 1999); Independent Consultant Finds Widespread
Independence Violations at PricewaterhouseCoopers,SEC NEWS DIGEST,

Jan. 6, 2000, at 1-2.
13
See id.

See Floyd Norris, Accounting Firm Is Said to Violate Rules
Routinely, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 2000, at C6.
14
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emphasized the faulty culture and controls at the firm. 5 A
recent study found warning signs concerning investors' perceptions of weak independence. 6 These reports suggest
that this problem could develop over time, and may be related to the development of accounting firms' multidisciplinary business services.
Recently, the SEC has delegated its functions concerning
accountants' independence to a new Independence Standards Board ("the Board"). The Board was tasked with
closely monitoring dangers ranging from the lack of accountants' independence to the integrity of the financial
markets. In January 1999, the Board issued its first standard, requiring auditors subject to the independence rules
to disclose in writing, at least annually, all relationships
between the auditors and the clients that may reasonably
be viewed to bear on independence. 7 This standard thus
requires an annual meeting between the auditors and the
clients' audit committee. 8 An auditing system may be weak
if it targeted auditors are vested with the decision power
regarding their own potential violations, especially if there
is no monitoring system in place. To this end, at least one
large accounting firm has been employing an electronic system that is updated for accuracy. 9 Further, violations
should be documented and resolved formally. The SEC is
planning
to extend its investigation to other accounting
20
firms.

While PwC posted one of its compliance tools for new
partners and employees on its website," the SEC is pre15

B6.

See When FinancialCops Turn Bad, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at

16 See Tuckey, supra note 6, at 1; Letter from Lynn E. Truner, Chief

Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Sherwin P.
Simmons, Chair, Commission on Interdisciplinary Practice American
Bar Association (Jan. 22, 1999) (discussing the principles of

independence) (on file with author).
17
See id.
18
See id.
19

2

See Norris, supranote 13, at C6.
See Auditors Play with Integrity, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Jan. 10,

2000, at 8.
21
See Kraw, supranote 8, at 4.
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paring additional probes, and Congress is pressing the SEC
to do more in this area.22 An apparent dissatisfaction with
the auditing services provided by the Big Five has emerged
in recent years.2 The increased number of lawsuits filed
against these firms may manifest this dissatisfaction.'
Perhaps the corporate auditing system, both external and
internal, resulted in a tendency to cut corners, bend rules,
and massage numbers that can distort issuers' performances and inflate share prices.25 Consequently, the incidence of fraud linked to auditors' poor performance is rising.2" This trend is dangerous to our market economy because direct verification of the issuers' financial statements
is very costly for investors. If the issuers' financial statements are unreliable, investors will either demand a higher
premium for their money, thereby raising the cost of capital
for issuers, or deny issuers capital altogether.
Arguably, these suits have arisen not on the merits but
because the firms represent a "deep pocket." Perhaps auditors' certifications raise unrealistic expectations. The public believes that an audit provides the final (and only) number; however, auditing is a more subjective discipline than27
it seems. Auditing represents an opinion, not a certainty.
Thus, people's expectations cannot be the basis of the standard for auditors' liabilities. Auditors should not be held to
a simple, clear-cut liability rule, but given protection if they
act in good faith.
Globalization and changed objectives bring their own
issues. The Big Five accounting firms sign off on accounts
in foreign countries, based on local standards, and these are
See Norris, Rules That Only An Accountant Could Fail to
Understand?,supranote 2, at C1.
2
See Simon Caulkin, Calling Our Auditors to Order, OBSERVER,
Jan. 16, 2000, at 9.
24
See Auditors Play with Integrity, supranote 18, at 8.
See When FinancialCops Turn Bad, supranote 14, at B6; Claire
A. Hill, Why FinancialAppearances Might Matter: An Explanation for
"DirtyPooling"and Some Other Types ofFinancial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 141 (1997) (discussing the "beautification" of companies'
financial statements).
26
See Caulkin, supra note 21, at 9.
22

27

See id.
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far less rigid than those standards in the United States
are.28 Auditors must certify financial statements under different standards or impose United States standards that
are unacceptable in other countries. Certification of such
global audits under different standards may mislead readers, but this communication defect could be remedied by
appropriate disclosure. The attitude of the auditors themselves is a more serious concern. Adherence to more relaxed local standards (whether or not certification is accompanied by comments about the differences with United
States standards) creates undesirable tendencies in the
auditors themselves. People are creatures of habit, auditors
included. Lax approaches may percolate into the United
States' practices to the detriment of our system.
V. THE INDEPENDENCE RULES DEBATE
The independence rules applicable to accountants are
also the subject of controversy. On one side of the debate
are arguments for tightening these rules. The proponents
of this view put an increasingly high value on contribution
of accountants to the integrity of the securities markets,
and believe that accountants' independence and legitimacy
are crucial to investors' trust. Further, in their opinion,
even if the cost of audits will rise upon barring accountants
from consulting, the cost of protection per share may be
negligible, and investors would gladly pay the difference for
the reduced risk. Some speculate that the accountants
themselves would welcome relief from the pressure to sell
the services of colleagues.
Others argue for the separation of audit from consulting
as an assurance of independence. They argue that the consulting practice, not the ownership of a small number of the
client issuer's shares, is the real threat to the accountants'
independence. Pressures and incentives to market the consulting services can subvert the auditor's independence.

'

See Michaels & Peel, supra note 3, at 2.
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Ownership of a few thousand dollars' worth of the issuer's
shares is less likely to have this corruptive effect.
Critics of independence rules argue that the rules are
too strict and should be reviewed. They argue that the independence rules are arcane, rigid, detailed, fixed, and too
numerous. The rules apply to specific independence decisions and afford little opportunity to consider new situations through reasoning by analogy. Independence rules
have become detached from the business realities and the
evolution of society in the twenty-first century. The rules
ignore the development of the Big Five, and do not take into
consideration the changes in the industry and in the environment. Therefore, it has been suggested that the rules
not only should be simplified, but also that the itemized
rule-based model should be changed.
The critics of the rule question the fundamental assumptions on which independence of accountants is required.
They seek to reexamine, and take a fresh look at, the conceptual framework for auditors' independence, and consider
new factors. For example, they ask: What role should costbenefit analysis play in accountants' independence? They
argue that perhaps we should consider the benefits from
the large accounting firms to themselves and to the issuers
and weigh these benefits against the added risk of public
distrust in the markets. Perhaps, they say, the benefits
may far outweigh the risks.
The critics also question the assumptions concerning
investor confidence, and whether the risk and safeguard
analysis is appropriate in evaluating the risk from weaker
independence of accountants. These critics seek to determine the role of users' perceptions in setting the standards
for accountants' independence.
These questions are loaded and go to the heart of the
problem. We have always made the assumption that independence and public confidence should not be subject to a
See Julie Dunn, In Defense of Auditors, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,

2000, § 3, at 2 (quoting Deloitte & Touche CEO as saying that
independence rules are "arcane, archaic, overly complex").
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cost-benefit analysis.

Experience in "runs" and "bubbles"

suggests that investors (maybe others as well) are not always entirely rational. Investors who cease to trust the
informational integrity of particular issuers may cease to
trust the integrity of the entire markets. The available literature on public mania suggests as much." Further, the
tendency of investors not to make a cost-benefit analysis is
tied to the degree of risk that they are willing to take. At
some point, investors are not willing to make the costbenefit analysis and will just pull out. If their risk level is
lower (e.g., with respect to bank deposits) they will pull out
sooner, and do so from all banks, whether the banks are in
a weak or strong financial situation. Although investors
might not be so risk-averse with respect to equities, if they
suspect unfair treatment or untrue financial statements,
they might pull out as well. In the best case, they will discount the price either of the particular issuer whose financial statements are not verifiable, or the issuers similar to
that issuer, or the securities in general.
The question is whether we can play the game of riskbenefit with investors' confidence. If the trial is unsuccessful, the damage may be horrendous and may take years to
remedy. If the trial is successful, then the few large firms,
and perhaps the large issuers, who would take advantage of
"one-stop" shopping, will continue to benefit. However, investor confidence is not an area in which we can experiment
at low cost. The uncertainty of the outcome and the impossibility of reversing a catastrophic result in a short-time
period require rejection of the risk-benefit analysis, or at
least warrant a long and hard evaluation of this approach.
Critics of the independence rule also focus on the rule's
details. One question is: To whom should independence
restrictions on audit firms apply? Should these restrictions
apply to the firm, the engagement team, or all partners in
the firm? Should applications of the restrictions vary based
on facts and circumstances? These questions may bring
30 See 1 TAMAR

FRANKEL,

SECURITIZATION 89 n.15 (1991) (citing

works on public manias, bubbles and runs).
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about more flexibility and more reasoned results. While
auditors directly involved in an issuer's audit should not
own any of the issuer's securities (including derivative securities), perhaps those not participating in the audit on the
consulting side of the firm may hold certain amounts of
stocks or bonds of the issuer (limited by dollar amount or as
a percentage of salary). Indeed, perhaps all partners may
hold mutual fund securities or participate in blind trusts.
Partners in such firms usually hold shares of a fund that
manages their pensions or investments, and may also be
insulated from these funds. Hence, total insulation of the
parties from the most acceptable and prevalent form of investment today is unnecessary.
In addition, the large accounting firms are global and
must remain so because their clients operate worldwide.
The only reason for precluding this practice is to ensure
that the firms do not follow the more lax foreign accounting
rules outside the United States. Effective internal control,
not blanket prohibition, is required to prevent such a race
to the bottom and maintain high accounting standards.
One proposal, which may have followers, suggests that
accounting firms disclose whether they have a consulting
practice, or whether they are "pure" auditors. Presumably,
the issuers will examine investors' preferences to find out
whether the difference between pure and diversified auditing firms affects investors' trust, and hence the price of
their securities. That approach allows the markets-the
investors and their advisers-to determine how accounting
firms will be structured and what is the necessary degree of
independence that accountants should demonstrate. The
concern that a negative investor opinion would threaten the
integrity of the markets, may be ameliorated by market
surveys and focus groups. If the danger is negligible, disclosure may be worth trying. In the last analysis, consulting practices lower professional standards for auditing,
while self-regulation may not be effective to combat the
great temptations posed. One academic has warned the
industry that violations of the independence rules may lead
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to SEC intervention and threaten auditors' autonomy.3 1
This threat may serve as a wake-up call for the entire accounting profession.
VI. A POSSIBLE ANSWER
Current events, occurring while this Article was being
prepared, seem to provide an answer. The accounting firms
are separating their consulting practices. Notwithstanding
the business reasons for allowing (or even encouraging)
large accounting firms to engage in consulting services,
One
multidisciplinary practices should be prohibited."2
large firm, Andersen Worldwide, has separated its consulting and auditing practices. However, the separation
was caused by internal disagreements rather than because
of the independence issue. History repeats itself as Andersen Consulting is attempting to separate from its parent, Andersen Worldwide.34 Again, the rift is caused by an
internal disagreement. 5 However, two other members of
the Big Five firms are planning to separate their practices.

Ernst & Young recently sold its consulting business.36 PwC
has already decided to separate its auditing and lawyering

31 See Government May Intervene in Audits, Vanderbilt B-School
Professor Warns; Recent SEC Violations Threaten Future of Independent

Audit, PR NEWSWmE, Jan. 20, 2000.

See Kraw, supra note 8, at 4 ("If the accountants don't pay
attention to their own professional rules, how can they be expected to
abide by anyone else's?").
See Damian Wild, Andersen Petitionsfor a Divorce, INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 24, 1999, at 2 (noting that 1989 restructuring was caused
by clash of cultures and consultants' demand for more independence).
3
See Natalie Evans, For the Record, CRAIN'S CHIcAGO Bus., Nov.
29, 1999, at 66.
See Melody Petersen, Consultantsat Andersen Take Action, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 18, 1997, at D2 (noting that Andersen Consulting contends
that Arthur Andersen broke its 1989 agreement by "aggressively
entering into Andersen Consulting's business").
' See E & Y Sells Consulting Business to Cap Gemini, MGMT.
32

CONSULTANT INT'L, Mar. 13, 2000, at 1; Michael Peel, Gravy Train'sEnd

ofLine, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2000, at 2.
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practices from its consulting business."' Paradoxically, even
a sale of the auditing part does not necessarily solve all
problems. If the auditing practice sells its stake in the consulting practice, what will the auditing part do with the
proceeds, which may amount to millions of dollars? It cannot distribute the equity stakes to the partners. In addition, with a sale of a firm's consulting practice, profitability
will decrease. How will auditors attract talent? Presumably they will have to raise the fees to offer better pay. How
much will the market bear? The future of these firms may
bring us the answers.

37
See Diana B. Henriques, Auditing Firm Plans to Split Its
Businesses, N.Y. Tnms, Feb. 18, 2000, at C8; Piskora, supra note 6, at 28
(reporting that newspaper has learned that IBM is considering buying or
aligning itself with PwC consulting business).

